转帖:2008年金融危机的五个意外结局

Discussion in 'Currencies' started by wj2000, Sep 13, 2018.

  1. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001079398
    2008年金融危机的五个意外结局
    邰蒂:如果你回顾这10年来金融业的演变历程,相对于雷曼兄弟破产后那段恐慌时期的主流叙述,至少有五个地方令人意外。

    更新于2018年9月13日 06:04 英国《金融时报》专栏作家 吉莲•邰蒂
    预测很不容易,尤其是对未来的预测——据称这是一则古老的丹麦笑话。但这并没有阻止金融评论员们在今年秋季热烈推测金融的未来,同时围绕谁预测了2008年金融危机展开辩论。
    随着事后分析的增多,还有一个耐人寻味的问题是:与10年前我们的预期相比,当今的金融走势看上去怎样?我自己的答案是:“有点意外”。
    最值得一提的是,如果你考察金融业的演变历程,相对于雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产后那段恐慌时期的主流叙述,至少有五个特点似乎明显违反直觉,甚至怪异。
    意外之处在哪里呢?从债务的问题说起吧。10年前,投资者和金融机构在付出惨重代价后再次认识到,过高的杠杆率可能是危险的。因此,人们自然会认为随着受过挫折的银行和借款者感到恐慌,债务将下滑。

    并非如此。美国抵押贷款市场确实经历了去杠杠化。银行和对冲基金行业也是如此。但全球债务总额出现飙升:去年,全球债务达到国内生产总值(GDP)的217%,较2007年水平高出近40个百分点。
    第二个意外是银行的规模。雷曼破产的连锁效应表明了市场力量和风险高度集中、以至于“太大而不能倒”的金融机构所构成的危险。并不令人意外的是,有人呼吁把它们分拆。
    但这些巨兽变得甚至更大了:根据最新数据,美国五大银行控制着银行资产的47%,而2007年为44%,规模最大的1%的共同基金管理着45%的资产。目前还不清楚,是否有任何监管机构解决了“太大而不能倒”这个难题。
    第三个违反直觉的变化是美国金融业的相对实力。2008年,这场危机似乎是“美国制造”的:美国次贷和华尔街金融工程是危机的根源。因此,人们自然认为美国金融业随后可能会威风扫地。
    并非如此。如今,美国投行几乎在任何一个方面(交易份额、股本回报以及股价表现)都让欧洲竞争对手相形见绌,在伦敦受到英国退欧的影响之际,纽约和芝加哥这些金融中心继续壮大。
    接下来是非银行金融公司的问题。10年前,投资者发现了“影子银行”行业,当时他们认识到,由不透明的投资工具组成的一个巨大隐藏生态系统构成系统性风险。监管机构承诺予以打击。那么影子银行收缩了吗?未必:根据对影子银行业的保守定义,如今其规模为45万亿美元,控制着全球13%的金融资产,高于2010年的28万亿美元。针对银行的监管打击,只是将更多活动推向了影子行业。
    第五个要考虑的问题是危机后的惩罚。当银行一家接一家倒下时,人们自然会假设一些银行家将被判刑。毕竟,在上世纪80年代的美国储贷协会(savings and loans)丑闻后,出现了数百宗诉讼。然而,尽管过去10年银行因罚金(总共超过3210亿美元)受到打击,但极少数入狱的金融家只是那些犯下与危机不直接相关的罪行的人,例如操纵伦敦银行同业拆借利率(Libor)的交易员。
    如今,爱嘲讽的人可能会说,这五大意外表明,在西方,金融精英仍然强大;他们可能会辩称(正如我的同事马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)所观察到的那样)这些意外还反映出这些精英——以及潜在的改革者——未能提出替代意识形态。但第六个违反直觉的变化可能会解释这些动态:政治领域发生的事情。
    10年前,人们自然会预测,这场危机将促使政治左翼重新崛起。2009年,“占领华尔街”(Occupy Wall Street)运动发起的反对自由市场过分行为的活动起初得到了支持。但如今,获得最大选举回报的主要是右翼党派。甚至在这些团体打着反体制的口号竞选时,他们在总体上对整改(或者甚至讨论)金融架构的兴趣不大。
    未来几年,这种情况会发生变化吗?或许会。但关键问题是:过去10年的经验表明,提出预测时最好谦逊一点,而且了解哪些事情没有发生有时甚至比实际发生的事情更加重要。
    译者/梁艳裳
     
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  2. (转)Lehman's Carcass Has Handed Huge Profits to Distressed Funds

    (Bloomberg) -- It was a bold move: buy at Lehman Brothers’s darkest hour. But a decade after Lehman’s collapse, a handful of hedge funds that bought up the bank’s debt for pennies on the dollar have made even more money than seemed possible.

    More than $124.6 billion has flowed to Lehman creditors, and another $1.4 billion may yet be coming. At least $92.2 billion has gone to those last in line: unsecured creditors. Some of the largest and earliest buyers, according to people familiar with the case, were distressed debt hedge funds Elliott Management Corp., Paulson & Co., Baupost Group LLC, and Varde Partners.

    Expected to recover just 21 cents on the dollar when the reorganization came together in 2011, they’ve so far received 45 cents. In Lehman’s U.K. unit, senior claims have gotten 140 cents on the dollar.

    While Lehman’s bankruptcy, the largest in history, with $613 billion in debt, was a boon to the funds, it’s not unprecedented. After Enron Corp.’s 2001 bankruptcy, unsecured creditors eventually got returns of 53 cents on the dollar, triple that projected by the plan.

    “Lehman was a catastrophe,” said James Peck, who presided over the early years of its bankruptcy. But reaching a resolution in 2011 went relatively smoothly. The big reason: Hedge funds had a strong incentive to resolve issues because they had bought claims at a deep discount and wanted to see them gain value, he said.

    ‘Fog of Lehman’
    The original investors, such as pension funds or Lehman’s business partners, walked away with immediate money but with less than they would have if they’d held on.

    The recoveries since defy early expectations amid what was known as the “fog of Lehman.” Banks like Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Citigroup Inc. had huge derivatives-related claims with Lehman that wouldprove nightmaresto quantify. At first, some thought there would be nothing for unsecured creditors.

    “We had no information, literally,” recalled Shai Waisman, an initial lawyer on the case.

    Then, the hedge funds came, racing to figure out where assets were, even before Lehman’s advisers at Alvarez & Marsal did so. Elliott bought Lehman bonds within days, one of the people said. Soon after, it began buying claims on the secondary market at a deep discount.

    Price Appreciation
    The bonds had traded at around 8.625 cents on the dollar at the outset. They have now appreciated to 47.5 cents. Claims traded anywhere from 10 cents to 30 cents in the early years, a person familiar with the prices said.

    One of the biggest legal fights was over whether to view Lehman’s assets and debts as pooled at the holding company or belonging to its warren of subsidiaries and foreign affiliates. Dan Kamensky, who had just joined Paulson from Lehman, giving him insights into how the company ran itself, pushed the consolidated position. His view was eventually echoed by Bryan Marsal, the restructuring officer in charge of Lehman, and Pacific Investment Management Co. and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, which also had claims against the holding company.

    Two Camps
    “The marketplace was trying to analyze each box within the Lehman complex,” recalls Kamensky, who now runs Marble Ridge Capital. “But the math became simple when you started thinking about it as a consolidated entity.”

    That viewpittedit against hedge funds that were more diversified in their Lehman holdings. These funds included Elliott, Baupost, King Street Capital Management, Davidson Kempner Capital Management and CarVal Investors. The people familiar spoke on condition of anonymity because the claims trades are private. Elliott, Varde, CarVal and Baupost declined to comment on the performance of their claims. King Street, Davidson Kempner and Paulson didn’t return calls for comment.

    By January 2011, a rough deal was reached carving up the Lehman pie, avoiding a more protracted court battle. Both sides fared well, and the compromises reached then allowed the payouts that continue today, as the estate, run by 77 people, continues to marshal and distribute them. Paulson, Calpers and Pimco ended up with around 93 percent of the value they sought, by one person’s calculation.

    “Everyone involved was right in thinking this was so complicated that if there wasn’t a deal to cut, everyone was worse off, and it could be caught up many more years in court, so reasonable heads prevailed,” said Scott Hartman, a partner at Varde.

    To Waisman, who left Lehman’s bankruptcy adviser Weil Gotshal & Manges to become chief executive at Prime Clerk, this success came at a cost. An orderly wind-down would have preserved more value -- and it would have changed who the winners were.

    “It would have returned that money to the initial holders, like pension funds, rather than the opportunistic buyers,” Waisman said.

    ©2018 Bloomberg L.P.
     
  3. 所以“意外结局”并不意外
     
  4. 每一场危机都是一次收割(瓜分)。。。